We study two governments, each considering whether or not to compete to attract a foreign monopoly Þrm into its own domestic market. The competition, should it occur, would involve offering incentives to the Þrm. The incentives, which are costly for the governments to provide, lower the Þrm's marginal cost of production. Faced with the offers from each country, the Þrm must choose one of four options: to enter either of the markets, produce there and export to the other, to enter both markets simultaneously with only local production, or to reject all offers. We Þnd conditions under which it would be optimal for one of the two countries not to compete with the other, preferring instead to import the commodity from the country that attracted the Þrm, rather than incurring the additional costs that would have been necessary to make its own economy more attractive to the foreign Þrm.
Introduction
In this paper we model the decision processes of two countries that are considering whether or not to compete to attract a foreign Þrm to produce in their respective domestic markets. We provide some answers to such ques- Empirical studies, however, by construction, are conditioned on the decisions made by the various countries to attract FDI, and thus cannot help us explore those decisions themselves. Yet, with the fall of communism and the subsequent emergence of market-based countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the decisions made by governments in regard to economic development, and to FDI in particular, have been pushed into higher proÞle. It has been widely remarked, for instance, that some countries in transition acquired signiÞcant ßows of FDI, while others only a trickle. 4 Should we conclude, for example, based on this uneven record, that the former group made wise decisions while the latter did not? Or, should we conclude that the former chose decisions to attract FDI, while the latter chose to pursue alternatives? While these questions seem natural in the context of economies in transition, they are more broadly applicable since an uneven pattern of distribution across 3 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , Mauro (1995) , Bardhan (1997) , Kaufman and Wei (1999) , and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) . 4 See, for example, Campos and Coricelli (2000) .
countries is characteristic of FDI. Our work addresses some of these issues by making explicit both the decision processes of the countries attempting to attract FDI, and the decision process of the Þrm in choosing where, and how, to locate.
In our model we study two governments, each considering whether or not to compete to attract a foreign monopoly Þrm into its own domestic market. 5 The competition, should it occur, would involve offering incentives to the Þrm. The incentives, which are costly for the governments to provide, lower the Þrm's marginal cost of production. Faced with the offers from each country, the Þrm must choose one of four options: to enter either of the markets, produce there and export to the other, to enter both markets simultaneously with only local production, or to reject all offers. We Þnd conditions under which it would be optimal for one of the two countries not to compete with the other, preferring instead to import the commodity from the country that attracted the Þrm, rather than incurring the additional costs that would have been necessary to make its own economy more attractive to the foreign Þrm. We also show that when importing is a possibility, there are conditions under which, knowing that it will lose (win) the competition for the Þrm, the country nonetheless Þnds it optimal to (not) compete. Finally, we establish the relationship between the option chosen by the Þrm and the characteristics of the two governments trying to attract the Þrm. 5 We make no distinction between a country and its government and use the terms interchangeably.
Other gaming models that involve incentives offered by a government to attract a Þrm include Brander and Spencer (1987) , Haaparanta (1996) , Barros and Cabral (2000) , and Janeba (2001) . For example, Brander and Spencer can be interpreted in our framework by imagining that the two different policy options (taxation or tariff) are assigned to two separate countries, which otherwise share identical characteristics, and do not have the ability to export output to the other. Each country acts unilaterally in trying to attract FDI from a single Þrm. Haaparanta has a game of subsidies between the two countries, but the Þrm has already committed to investing in them and is only considering how to divide a known expenditure between the two countries. Barros and Cabral consider two countries already having decided to compete for a foreign Þrm using subsidies to lower the Þrm's marginal cost. The Þrm has only two choices: to set up and produce either in country 1 and export to country 2, or to set up and produce in country 2 and export to country 1. Janeba studies two countries, the smaller of which seeks to attract production from a Þrm in the larger country. In considering the established tax policy in the larger country, the Þrm, when offered a tax incentive that could possibly change from the smaller country, chooses to set up capacity and then produce in either of the two countries, or in both of them. Some other papers that relate to ours include Barros (1994) , Motta (1992), Kaufman and Wei (1999) , and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) .
We make two main contributions to this literature. First, by allowing the government to decide to compete or not compete for FDI, we have enlarged its strategic choice set. This permits us to show that it is not necessarily because it would lose in a competition for FDI that a government would choose not to compete. Nor is it necessarily because a government would win a competition for FDI that it would choose to compete. Thus, we are able to conclude that winning or losing a competition for FDI might be a strategic choice of a government. Second, by allowing the Þrm to choose among four options, we have enlarged the choice set of the Þrm. This allows us to show the relationship of the characteristics of the countries to the market structure that the Þrm would choose.
The plan of the paper is a follows. In Section 2 we present our model. In Section 3 we analyze the game for speciÞc demand and cost functions. We present a discussion and conclusions in Section 4.
The Model

Governments: The Game They Face
There are two governments, G 1 and G 2 , which are each interested in attracting a foreign monopoly Þrm to set up production of a homogeneous good in their country. The motivation for wishing to attract this Þrm and hence FDI may be the knowledge or technology spillovers that are said to accrue from FDI, or the lowering of existing unemployment that the FDI might afford.
Each G i makes an offer to the Þrm that we model as the marginal cost of producing its output that the Þrm would face if it located in that country. This summary number reßects the actual cost of production in that country, and depends on the given infrastructural of the country, the quality of its legal system, its level of corruption, etc. Each G i chooses to compete for the Þrm (C) or not to compete (NC). If a G i chooses not to compete, its offer of marginal cost remains at its initial value which we denote by ω i0 , i = 1, 2.
If a G i chooses to compete, then at a cost, the country offers the Þrm the marginal cost ω i < ω i0 . The proÞt maximizing Þrm makes its decision based on the offers given by the countries.
The Firm: The Structure it Chooses
Given two offers of marginal cost, ω 1 and ω 2 from G 1 and G 2 , respectively, the Þrm chooses one of the following four options to maximize its proÞts:
Option 1 : Accept the offer of ω 1 from G 1 . Establish production in G 1 for Þxed cost F and produce for the markets in G 1 and G 2 from G 1 . The marginal cost of producing a unit in G 1 and selling it in G 2 is augmented by trade costs s 1 .
Option 2 : Accept the offer of ω 2 from G 2 . Establish production in G 2 for Þxed cost F and produce for the markets in G 2 and G 1 from G 2 . The marginal cost of producing a unit in G 2 and selling it in G 1 is augmented by trade costs s 2 .
Option 3 : Accept the offer of ω 1 from G 1 and the offer of ω 2 from G 2 .
Establish production in G 1 for Þxed cost F and produce there only for the market in G 1 , and establish production in G 2 for Þxed cost F and produce there only for the market in G 2 . We refer to this simultaneous establishment of production facilites in G 1 and G 2 as the multinational option. 6 Option 4 : Accept neither offer of ω 1 or ω 2 and set up in neither G 1 nor
, and π 0 (ω 1 , ω 2 ) be the proÞt to the Þrm when the respective options are chosen. If we let π
then being a proÞt maximizer, the Þrm chooses Option 1 when π
Option 2 when π * = π 2 , Option 3 when π * = π and Option 4 when π * = π 0 . When π * is not unique, we assume that the Þrm is indifferent between the options.
Assume that the Þrm is capable of producing a single, homogeneous commodity. We let Q i (P ) be the demand function for this commodity produced in G i and P i (ω) be the Þrm's proÞt maximizing price in G i when marginal cost is ω. That is,
It is easily shown that In this case, we call the common value α *
In the case when i=3, the beneÞts to each country depend on the (possibly different) bids of each G i so we retain the notation of α * 3j , j = 1, 2.
For any Þnal offer of marginal cost to the Þrm when the governments choose (C, C), G 1 can derive beneÞts in one of three ways depending on the result of the Bertrand competition: by production taking place in that country (Options 1 and 3 ) or by importing the product from G 2 (Option 2 ). 8 We assume that the net beneÞts to G 1 of more production (Option 1 )
are greater than those of less production (Option 3 ). Furthermore, G 1 would never make an offer which could produce a beneÞt less than the one it would receive if it imported the good from G 2 . Thus, the lowest offer that G 1 would 8 Recall that Option 4 yields zero net beneÞts.
be willing to make, ω 1L , satisÞes
Similarly, ω 2L satisÞes (2)
We are now able to address the question of the Þnal bids from the Bertrand competition when the governments choose (C, C).
Option 1 would be chosen by the Þrm if the bids ω 1L and ω 2L were made and if they satisfy 
Option 3, the multinational option, would be chosen by the Þrm if, at the lowest bids ω 1L and
However, when this inequality is strict, G 
and therefore that π * = π 0 .
Summarizing the Game the Governments Face
Each G i independently chooses whether to compete for FDI or not. The Game Matrix 1 
Evaluating the Net BeneÞts
In order to proceed in this investigation, we must assume some form of the net beneÞts functions or, equivalently, some objectives of the governments involved. The governments could be self-serving, corrupt, or concerned with the welfare of their respective populations. We choose to model the latter but note that the development below would be the same for any speciÞcation of these functions. In particular, we assume that when a Þrm establishes production within a country, that country beneÞts in two ways: Þrst, by the consumer surplus it receives as a consequence of the production, and second, by additional beneÞts that accrue from the act of production itself. On the other hand, when a country only receives imports, its beneÞts are restricted to the consumer surplus. Firm proÞts provide no beneÞts to the host country since we assume they are completely repatriated to the Þrm's home country.
The consumer surplus of own-country production and that of importing the product will differ as a function of the price at which the good is sold in each country.
Beyond consumer surplus, we assume a country receives additional beneÞts as a consequence of production. These may be due, for example, to additional employment (see Brander and Spencer (1987) and Barros and Cabral (2000)) or to additions to know-how gained from the technology transfer or spillover aspects of the particular production (see Borensztein,
De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Campos and Coricelli (2000) , Saggi (2002) ,
and UN Economic Commission of Europe (2001)). In particular, we assume for tractability that the additional beneÞts accruing from production are proportional to that production, with k i being the constant of proportionality for G i .
We assume that when G i chooses to compete and wins the competition at the marginal cost, say ω, it incurs a cost for having won the Þrm. This cost, = [
where 0 ≤ c 1 (·) ≤ 1, and the net beneÞts to G 2 are
Since under (C, N C), G 1 could never receive imports if it failed to attract the Þrm, and since there is always a positive net beneÞt to G 1 from attracting the Þrm, the outcome B 
where 0 ≤ c 2 (·) ≤ 1 and the net beneÞts to G 1 are
Again, the outcome B 
If the Þnal bid of the Bertrand competition leads the Þrm to choose Option 2, then
If the Þnal bids of the Bertrand competition lead the Þrm to choose Option 3, then the Þrm has accepted the Þnal offers α * 31 and α * 32 from G 1 and G 2 , respectively. In this case, 
Analyzing the Game for SpeciÞc Demand and Cost Functions
For the remainder of the paper, we assume speciÞc forms of the demand functions and cost functions that enable us to explore the equilibria of Game Matrix 1. We let Q 1 (P ) = e −P , Q 2 (P ) = fe −P , and c i (ω) = e −β i ω , where
The parameter f reßects the relative size of the second market. We do not assume that this is less than one. In fact, as we later show, the value of one for f is not critical. The parameter β i in the cost function inversely reßects the cost (difficulty) to G i of implementing the offer ω. If β i is sufficiently small, then even a relatively high offer has a large cost.
Conversely, a sufficiently large value of β i implies a small cost for a relatively low offer.
Using these speciÞcations, the game, in strategic form, can be evaluated as follows:
where for (C, C):
where for (C, N C):
(B 
and where for (NC, NC): To complete the description of the game matrix, we must evaluate α 12 , α 21 , and α * ij , i = 1, ..., 4; j = 1, 2. Since α 12 and α 21 depend on ω jM and ω jB , j = 1, 2, and since α * ij depends on ω jL , j = 1, 2, we next evaluate these quantities.
Determining
For the outcome (C, NC), G 1 acts alone and, by our assumption about α 12 , is guaranteed to win the Þrm. Thus the Þnal bid will either be ω 1M or ω 1B .
If α 12 = ω 1M , G 1 maximizes its net beneÞts. Referring to the evaluations in Game Matrix 2, this maximum must satisfy
fers the largest marginal cost that is acceptable to the Þrm, that is, the marginal cost that produces non-negative proÞt for the Þrm. This offer satisÞes π 1 (ω 1B ) = 0, and using equations (1), the offer can be written as
Similarly, when the choices are (NC, C), and when α 21 = ω 2M , this max-
and the maximum net beneÞts achievable for
Also, when α 21 = ω 2B , this value must satisfy
Finally, we determine the lowest bid that G 1 would be willing to make in the Bertrand competition that occurs when the governments choose (C, C).
As discussed above, since the loss of the Þrm under these governmental choices can still provide beneÞts via imports, there will be a lowest offer that each country would be willing to make. We can evaluate these lower bids using the results in Game Matrix 2. If a given bid of ω by G 1 were the Þnal bid, then if it lost the Þrm completely to G 2 (Option 2 ), G 1 would receive net beneÞts 2 K 
. Similarly, we have for G 2 that ω 2L satisÞes e −β 2 ω 2L = 1 − γ 2 or
. Note that
and that ω 1L
is monotonically increasing in γ 1 . Thus, the lower bound ω 1L is decreasing in k 1 , s 2 and d 1 . Similarly, ω 2L is decreasing in k 2 , s 1 and d 2 .
We assume that when the Þrm faces a choice between two options that yield the same proÞt, it will be indifferent to the choice and we assign the choice depending on the context. Furthermore, if a government faces two choices that yield the same net beneÞts, we assume that it will be indifferent to the choice and we assign the choice depending on the context.
Determining the Equilibria
The game outlined above is one of complete information. As such, the question arises as to whether it is ever desirable for a government to compete for FDI if it knows that it will lose the Þrm in the competition. Conversely, would a country that knows it would win the competition choose not to compete? To address these questions, we explore the equilibria associated with this game. We begin with a few deÞnitions.
1−e −s 1 . Thus, K is a measure of relative size of the market in G 2 , adjusted for the costs of selling in both markets. As a result, we refer to K as the size index. We deÞned F as the Þxed cost of setting up production facilities in each country.
However, the units of F remain to be speciÞed. We measure the size of F in units of revenue minus variable cost. Since the setup cost is identical in both countries, we arbitrarily choose the revenue minus variable cost of G 2 at its lowest value, ω 2L . Revenue minus variable cost in G 2 is proportional to e . The smaller this ratio relative to unity, the smaller ω 1L needs to be. This ratio depends not only on R but also on the relative country sizes (f) and the trade costs of selling goods in the other markets (s 1 and s 2 ).
Note that if R is sufficiently large, then the proÞt of the Þrm would become negative. Thus, an upper bound on R is needed to preclude the Þrm from rejecting entirely the bid of G 1 .
From Section 3.1, the assumption of Proposition 1, ω 1L ≤ α 1 , may be written as
. This involves the comparison of two "cost-beneÞt" type terms. Since c i (ω) = e −β i ω is a decreasing function of β i for each ω, we can think of
as a simple measure of the cost to G i of making an offer of marginal cost ω. Also,
can be thought of as a measure of bargaining advantage to G 1 in attracting the Þrm, with a similar interpretation for 1 − γ 2 for G 2 .
Thus, this assumption, which compares the product of these terms, captures the relative strengths of the two governments in the Bertrand competition.
A consequence of this proposition is that even if the two countries are identical, i.e.,
not clear what choice the Þrm will make without further information. This follows since, for these values, the conditions required in the proposition for Option 1 to be chosen reduce to 1 − e −s 1 ≤ R ≤ 1. If, however, R < 1 − e −s 1 , then Option 3, the multinational choice, would be made by the Þrm as we show below in the discussion following Proposition 5.
Another consequence of ω 1L ≤ α 1 is that the winner of the Þrm need not necessarily be the country with the lower Þnal bid. For example, if Proposition 1 establishes a range of bids within which G 1 wins the Þrm.
However, the particular bid that wins the Bertrand competition, α = α * 1 , is the one in this interval that maximizes the net beneÞts to G 1 . We next identify this offer.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the Þnal bid of the
Bertrand competition corresponding to the choices (C, C), can take on only one of three values; that is α *
The next proposition establishes conditions under which the bids α 12 and α 21 , corresponding to the off-diagonal choices of the governments, can be uniquely identiÞed. 
Proof
See Appendix.
We are now able to establish the conditions that lead to unique equilibria of the game. We show that there are cases in which a government would compete for FDI knowing it will lose the competition, as well as other cases in which a government would choose to not compete for FDI even knowing that it would win the competition. 
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C, C) the Þrm chooses Option 1, i.e., G 1 wins the Þrm;
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C, NC) the Þrm chooses Option 1, i.e., G 1 wins the Þrm;
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (NC, C) the Þrm chooses Option 2, i.e., G 2 wins the Þrm.
By Þxing the cost functions at the parameters β 1B and β 2B , we have assumed in Proposition 4 that each G i , when acting to maximize its own net beneÞts, would choose to offer the Þrm its country's breakeven value. It is also assumed that, at these parameter values, the "cost-beneÞt" factor of As the last remarks suggest, a delicate balance in the parameters must exist to make it desirable for G 2 to compete knowing it will lose. In part (2) of Proposition 4 we show that, as one might expect, there are cases where, if a government knows it will lose, it will choose not to compete.
In part (3) of Proposition 4 we invoke another assumption that puts a bound on β 1B . Combining this assumption with the assumption that led to the conclusion that G 2 would opt to compete, we show that (NC, C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. In this game of complete information, and knowing therefore that it would win the Bertrand competition, G 1 nonetheless Þnds it advantageous not to compete. Part of the explanation of this is seen in the assumption that β 1B is small, or . Thus, for any such pair of bids, the Þrm elects to become a multinational ( Option 3).
It is not surprising that a condition that makes the multinational option attractive to the Þrm is one that forces the relative Þxed cost R to be small enough to warrant paying the Þxed cost twice. The bound on R depends on,
and cannot be determined separate from, the parameters that characterize the countries. But, smallness of the relative Þxed cost is not enough for the Þrm to elect to become a multinational. A second condition imposes a balancing requirement between the Þnal possible offers of the governments.
However, this balancing requirement is, by itself, not enough to cause the Þrm to choose the multinational option. For example when the two countries are identical, i.e.,
follows that ω 1L = ω 2L and the multinational option will be chosen if and only if R ≤ 1 − e −s 1 . In fact, even if K 6 = 1, so long as ω 1L = ω 2L , the second condition will be satisÞed if and only if R ≤ 1 − Ke −s 1 . In general, similarity of the countries, plus a low relative Þxed cost, are both needed to produce the multinational outcome.
Proposition 5 establishes a range of bids within which the Þrm chooses to become a multinational. However, the particular bids that win the Bertrand competition, α * 31 and α * 32 , are the ones that maximize the net beneÞts of the respective governments.
We are now able to establish the unique Nash equilibria when the Bertrand competition corresponding to (C, C) leads the Þrm to choose to become a multinational.
Proposition 6
Let c i (ω) = e −β iB ω , i = 1, 2, where β iB are determined under the conditions of Proposition 3. Furthermore, let R ≤ 1 − Ke −s 1 , and
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C, C) the Þrm chooses Option 3, i.e., the Þrm sets up production in both G 1 and G 2 , becoming a multinational; N C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (C, NC) the Þrm chooses Option 1, i.e., G 1 wins the Þrm; (NC, C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, at (NC, C) the Þrm chooses Option 2, i.e., G 2 wins the Þrm.
Proof
The conditions on R, ω 1L , and ω 2L in Proposition 6 imply that, should the G i choose (C, C) , the Þrm would choose Option 3. However, the choice of the governments to compete needs some further conditions. These limit the size of the costs of competing and losing, i.e., the d i . In part (1), where these limits are satisÞed, (C, C) becomes the unique Nash equilibrium. In this case, each government chooses partial production over the choice to import.
In part (2) of Proposition 6, the Þrm chooses Option 1. Here, G 2 chooses to import from G 1 rather than to compete and have the Þrm set up production in G 2 for the market in G 2 alone. The conditions that lead to this choice by G 2 are that its market is not too small, and that its cost of reducing its offer of marginal cost to the Þrm is large. Again, interpreting the bounds on size and cost require knowledge of the parameters. Part (3) has a parallel interpretation to part (2). Proposition 6, together with Proposition 4, show that there are cases in which the governments will choose to compete or will choose not to compete whatever the forseen decision the Þrm would make in each situation.
Discussion and Conclusions
The model that we propose involves a game between two governments competing to attract a single Þrm. Each government (country) is deÞned by Þve characteristics: a demand function Q i , the costs c i (·) and d i of competing to acquire FDI, the trade cost s i of producing a unit of the good and selling it in the other country, the size, 1 or f, of its market, and an objective function B i of the government seeking FDI. The Þrm chooses its market structure by making one of four choices: to produce in G 1 and export to G 2 , to produce in G 2 and export to G 1 , to produce in both G 1 and G 2 with no exports (the multinational option), and to produce in neither G 1 nor G 2 . We derive the unique Nash equilibria corresponding to different characteristics of these countries. This allows us to establish the relationship of the countries' characteristics to the choice of participating or abstaining in a competition to acquire FDI. Also, by establishing the links between the decisions of the governments to compete and the structure of the Þrm, we are able to distinguish the conditions that would lead to the Þrm to become a multinational, or alternatively, to set up production in one country and export to the other.
In many of the models relating to FDI, it is assumed either that the Þrm has committed itself to engaging in FDI or that a government has committed itself to competing to attract FDI. Our results suggest that Þrms or governments with such commitments have special characteristics that make these commitments an outcome of a beneÞt-maximizing strategy. We show that these special characteristics that lead a government to compete do not necessarily imply that that government has an advantage in the competition.
This suggests that there is a heterogenity in the types of countries that compete to attract FDI. Of the countries that attract FDI, for example, some of them had the right characteristics to win in a competition for FDI and some of them won by default. Of the ones that won the Þrm through competition, some shared the Þrm with other countries (the multinational option), and some did not. Complicating these subgroupings further is the group of countries that would have won in the competition but chose for other reasons not to compete. The recognition of these groupings might have some consequences for empirical studies.
The actual cost to the government of making a Þnal offer to attract a Þrm plays an important role in our conclusions. By interpreting the source of this cost, we can explore some of the consequences when the competing governments are of different types. For example, the economies in transition at the start of the transition process represented competing governments with different, albeit weak, infrastructures. When a country has a weak infrastructure, we could assume that it would be very costly for it to make all the improvements necessary to reduce substantially the marginal cost that the Þrm would face in setting up production there. Since the parameter 1 β i reßects the size of this cost in our model, small values of β i would characterize governments with poor infrastructures. Ceteris paribus, this would force the Þrm to seek production elsewhere, as seen in Propositions 4 and 6. Similarly, a large cost could also be the consequence of certain types of governmental corruption. For a corrupt government to make a given offer of marginal cost to a Þrm, it would have to spend more to make that offer than would a non-corrupt government. Thus, for such corrupt governments,
would be large and would tend, again, to dissuade the Þrm from setting up production. However, in any competitive situation, it is really the relative cost of one government, as compared with that of the other, that is the critical comparison.
We also establish the relationship between the characteristics of the governments and the structure of the Þrm. As a result, we are able to add to a number of observations made in the literature. First, it is often argued that the size of a market is a magnet for FDI. Our results show that the size of the market plays a more nuanced role in attracting FDI. If f, the size of country 2, is large relative to country 1 (f → ∞), then K approaches the value e Furthermore, even if this last inequality were reversed, the Þrm might choose to split its production between the countries (the multinational option) as in Proposition 5. This choice would depend on lim f →∞ fR. Of course, when the two countries are identical except for size, leading to ω 1L = ω 2L , then as f → ∞, country 1 would never acquire the Þrm in its entirety. Thus the importance of size is in direct relationship to the similarity between the countries. As the characteristics diverge, the importance of size is tempered by these distinguishing characteristics. Second, low production costs are sometimes referred to as another magnet for FDI. Again, our model suggests a more nuanced role for production costs.
As discussed above following Proposition 1, the lowest offer of marginal cost does not necessarily attract the Þrm. Also, the relative sizes of the two Þnal offers by themselves, and indeed, even if they were equal, do not determine whether the Þrm produces exclusively in one country or divides its production between the two countries. Furthermore, two countries with the same Þnal offers could have different characteristics since in our model the Þnal offers depend on a function of β i , s i , and k i . Thus, we would expect that the Þrm might be attracted to countries with very different characteristics.
Third, it is sometimes argued that by raising import tariffs, a government can entice a Þrm to set up production in that country. As discussed following Proposition 1, if, say G 1 , were to engage in this behavior, then ceteris paribus, the Þrm would be less likely to locate in G 2 . But, if both G 1 and G 2 raised their tariffs, the Þrm would not necessarily go to either country alone, but could choose the multinational option. In general, the consequences of raising tariffs are difficult to forecast since the raising of the values of s 1 and s 2 affect the lowest bids of the countries as well as the size index and the relative Þxed costs.
In sum, we show that to assume at the outset that two countries compete for FDI diverts attention from the strategic nature of such a decision. By studying this decision, we are not only able to demonstrate how a country's characteristics relate to this choice, but also to establish the relationship between this choice and the decision of the Þrm as to where to locate and produce.
Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof
Let ω 1 ∈ [ω 1L , α 1 ] and ω 2 = ω 2L be the Þnal bids. Evaluating equations (1), we have that
). Thus, for π 1 to be no less than both π 2 and π, ω 1 ≤ ω 2 − ln K + min[ln(
, 0] = α 1 which was assumed.
To complete the proof, we must show that π 1 ≥ 0 at these offers, i.e., that e −ω 1 ≥ eF 1+fe −s 1 . By the deÞnition of R,
Since R ≤ 1, the right-hand-side of the last inequality is greater than α 1 , and it follows that π 1 ≥ 0. ♣
Proof of Proposition 2. Proof
Under Proposition 1, any offer between ω 1L and α 1 will win the Þrm for G 1 . Therefore, G 1 will choose the offer to maximize its net beneÞts from Option 1. The net beneÞts function is proportional to e −ω (1 − e −β 1 ω ).
This function is unimodal with a unique maximum satisfying e −β 1 ω 1M = 1 1+β 1 . Furthermore, the net beneÞts function is monotonically increasing for 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω 1M and monotonically decreasing for ω > ω 1M . Thus, if ω 1M > α 1 , the net beneÞts will be maximized at α *
Proof of Proposition 3. Proof
Since ( (2), recall that e −ω iM = ( 
To show part (1), we show that C is a dominant strategy for each government. We Þrst show that C is a dominant strategy for G 1 . Since B . Rewriting the last inequality, we must show 
But this inequality is the same
To show part (3), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G 2 and that 1 B 
). To show this, we show that for offers satisfying these inequalities, π ≥ π 1 , π ≥ π 2 , and π ≥ 0. Since π = e −(1+ω 1 ) + fe −(1+ω 2 ) − 2F
). Since ) ≥ R and R was assumed to satisfy R ≤ 1 − Ke −s 1 . So for the Þnal bids ω 1L and ω 2L , π * = π, and Option 3 is chosen by the Þrm.
If G 2 were to offer a higher bid than ω 2L , so long as the right inequality held, the same conclusion would hold. Also, if G 1 were to offer a higher bid so long as the left inequality held, the same conclusion would hold. Thus, G 2 could raise its bid up to α 32 satisfying e −ω 1L = e To show C is a dominant strategy for G 2 we need only show that 3 B . This inequality will hold if To show part (2), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G 1 and that 3 B 2 11 < B 2 12 . The demonstration that C is a dominant strategy for G 1 is the same as in part (1) which is assumed.
To show part (3), we show that C is a dominant strategy for G 2 and that 3 B 
